Income inequality and the economy of ideas by Bromell, David
Page 40 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 3 – August 2010
David Bromell 
growing unequal
Among OECD countries, New Zealand has moved from 
having relatively low income inequality in the early 1980s to 
having above average inequality by the mid-2000s (OECD, 
2008). Research conducted by Bryan Perry (2009) at the 
Ministry of Social Development shows that in New Zealand 
in 2008 the percentile ratio of income inequality (equivalised 
disposable household income before deducting housing 
costs) for P90 (top decile) to P10 (bottom decile) was 4.0, 
compared to 3.3 in 1984. The ratio for P80 (top quintile) to 
P20 (bottom quintile) for before-housing costs in 2008 was 
2.6, compared to 2.3 in 1984.
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2009). The ratio of the mid-point of 
bottom to top salary bands in public 
service organisations is not 2.6 or 5.5 but, 
on average, approximately 11.0. Things 
are marginally less equal in the university 
sector, where the ratio is, on average, 
approximately 13.0. In the private sector, 
I estimate that the ratio between the mid-
point of the average salary of a call centre 
operator in New Zealand ($37,500) and 
the value of the ‘compensation’ package 
paid to Paul Reynolds as chief executive of 
Telecom in the year to 30 June 2009 (an 
estimated $7.2 million according to the 
National Business Review (2009)) is 191.0.1
Even the least sceptical may wonder 
whether one employee is capable of 
providing, on average, value for money 
for one hour of work that is 11, 13 or 191 
times greater than that provided by a 
fellow employee.2 
I am personally inclined, moreover, 
to the idea that inequality damages 
democracy. For New Zealand to be 
viable in a global economy, we need 
effective democracy as well as efficient 
markets. As John Myles (2007, p.18) puts 
it: ‘Markets need democracy to make 
Those ratios are calculated for household 
incomes and over the population as a 
whole, in order to assess trends over time 
and to provide internationally comparable 
data. Of course, there are much greater 
inequalities at the level of individual 
income. The ratio for P80 to P20 for 
individual incomes in New Zealand’s 
working-age population (aged 18 to 64) in 
2009 was around 5.5.
In the state sector the salary bands of 
chief executives and the vice-chancellors 
of universities are a matter of public 
record (State Services Commission, 
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market economies viable for people.’ 
Marked income inequality risks damaging 
democracy to the extent that it creates two 
publics: one preoccupied with making 
ends meet, the other with keeping and 
growing its wealth; whereas effective 
democracy depends on a common public 
in which citizens see themselves as ‘all 
in the same boat’ (Cunningham, 2007; 
Dewey, 1927).
‘Equality is better for everyone’?
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett in 
The Spirit Level: why equality is better 
for everyone (2010) present a significant 
body of evidence that there is a strong 
association between social stratification, 
and specifically economic inequality, and 
health and social problems in developed 
nations. The evidence they present suggests 
that ‘we are affected very differently by 
the income differences within our own 
society from the way we are affected by 
the differences in average income between 
one rich society and another’ (Wilkinson 
and Pickett, 2010, p.11, italics theirs). In 
fact, ‘when we make comparisons between 
different societies, we find that these 
social problems have little or no relation 
to levels of average incomes in a society’ 
(ibid.). They acknowledge that association 
does not prove causality, and that even if 
there is a causal relationship, this does 
not tell us what is cause and what is effect 
(pp.190–6). Their book ‘simply points out 
that if you increase the income and status 
differences related to these [health and 
social] problems, then – unsurprisingly – 
the problems all become more common’ 
(p.196).
They assert, moreover, that the ill 
health and social problems associated 
with income and status differences affect 
all members of an unequal society, not 
just those at the bottom, although it may 
disproportionately affect those who are 
relatively least well off.3 The solution they 
propose (ibid., pp.238–9) to persistent and 
interconnected social problems is neither 
discrete and siloed interventions, nor 
‘joined-up’ services and programmes to 
address the symptoms of distress within 
the health, education, justice and welfare 
sectors. What is required is a concerted 
programme to address the cause of negative 
social outcomes by reducing economic 
inequality and social stratification and 
improving social mobility at the bottom. 
As Runciman (2009) puts it, Wilkinson 
and Pickett invite us to stop trying to join 
everything up, and to start seeing how it 
all fits together.
Turning a ‘big idea’ like that into public 
policy comes, however, at a price. The cost 
can be cognitive, economic and political.
Cognitive price
First, ideas come with a cognitive price 
because claims as to truth, or value, if they 
mean anything at all, may at least partially 
exclude other claims to validity. 
For example, the late Brian Barry, a 
self-styled ‘democratic socialist’, proposed 
(1998, pp.22-4) that in order to avoid social 
exclusion, nobody ought to have less than 
half the median income, and only a few 
ought to have more than three times the 
median income. That is, the ratio of the 
top income to the bottom income in a 
society ought not to exceed six to one. 
Median weekly income in New Zealand 
for all people aged 15 years and over from 
all sources (including for people with 
no source of income) in the June 2009 
quarter was $538 (Statistics New Zealand, 
2009). Barry’s proposal implies that no 
New Zealander should have a gross weekly 
income of less than $270 ($14,000 per 
annum) or more than $1,600 ($84,000 per 
annum). 
If we think that Barry, and Wilkinson 
and Pickett, are right, then we cannot 
consistently maintain, at the same time, 
that in the absence of externalities and 
other sources of market failure a market 
free of policy intervention will allocate 
resources efficiently. Nor can we base 
public policy on the ‘trickle down’ notion 
that if only the wealthy are able to earn 
more and keep more of their wealth, 
they will have an incentive to work 
harder, invest more, take more risks and 
drive economic development, which will 
eventually benefit those at the bottom. 
These ideas are mutually exclusive, at least 
in part. (We would also have to let go of 
some of our operative thinking about 
merit, risk, reward, ‘do it yourself ’ and 
‘free loading’.) 
Even if ideas and ways of thinking 
do not logically exclude one another, 
partially or completely, they can crowd 
each other out of thinking space and 
public discourse. For example, since the 
late 1980s New Zealand’s population has 
become significantly more ethnically 
diverse, due to higher Mäori and Pacific 
fertility rates, inter-ethnic partnering 
and parenting, and changing patterns of 
migration. New Zealand today has a more 
ethno-culturally diverse population than 
many other developed nations (Bromell, 
2008, pp.21–57). This diversity, together 
with the Mäori resurgence and Treaty of 
Waitangi settlements process since the 
mid-1970s, has meant that public discourse 
for over 30 years has been dominated by a 
politics of identity rather than a politics 
of social stratification, social mobility and 
economic equality. This ‘crowding out’ of a 
politics of equality is regrettable, because, 
at least in the short run, immigration 
and ethnic diversity tend to reduce social 
solidarity and social capital (Putnam, 
2007). When public discourse focuses on 
social group identities, rather than on the 
common good and the norms of mutual 
support that underpin redistribution 
When public discourse focuses on social 
group identities, rather than on the common 
good and the norms of mutual support that 
underpin redistribution within a welfare 
state, political will to address economic 
inequality can be seriously compromised ... 
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within a welfare state, political will to 
address economic inequality can be 
seriously compromised (Bromell, 2008, 
pp.295–9; 2009; cf. Banting, 2005; Banting 
and Kymlicka, 2006).
The cognitive, or at least rhetorical, 
price of a politics of equality is that we 
may have to focus less on our differences 
than on what we have in common; less 
on social group identities and special 
rights than on our common identity, our 
common needs, our common good.
Economic price
Secondly, ideas come with an economic 
price. This takes us to the core business of 
public policy: the definition and analysis 
of problems; the identification of options; 
evidence-gathering about correlation, 
causation and ‘what works’; and the 
calculation of cost-benefit and trade-
offs, who pays, risks and their mitigation, 
and contingency for unintended 
consequences. 
Wilkinson and Pickett emphasise that 
what matters is the level of inequality we 
finish up with, not the particular route 
that gets us there (Wilkinson and Pickett, 
2010, pp.245–7). They nevertheless outline 
two broad strategies: one using taxes and 
benefits to redistribute income; the other 
achieving narrower differences in gross 
market incomes before any redistribution. 
Both strategies come at a price.
New Zealand is a small, geographically 
isolated country with an open economy, 
a highly mobile population and a 
limited talent pool, operating within a 
competitive international labour market. 
Redistribution through tax and transfers, 
or a cap on higher salaries, run the risk 
that a larger number of those with the 
drive to get ahead will emigrate and take 
their capital, skills and entrepreneurial 
attitudes with them. As it is, around one 
million New Zealanders (about one in 
five) are currently living overseas. 
On the other hand, unless 
accompanied by greatly improved labour 
productivity, raising gross incomes at the 
lower end by increasing minimum wage 
rates will drive up the price of goods and 
services and make New Zealand exports 
and tourism products less competitive. 
Raising benefit levels would have a fiscal 
impact on the Crown accounts. It could 
also create a disincentive to employment 
and independence, when there is strong 
evidence that the best route out of poverty, 
at least for the vast majority, is through 
paid work. Long-term work absence has, 
in general, a negative impact on health and 
well-being (Royal Australasian College of 
Physicians, 2010).
Reducing inequality within a society 
in order to address the cause of health 
and social problems could well be a good 
idea. But talk is cheap unless practicable 
proposals are developed to implement 
this ‘big idea’, with robust analysis of who 
will pay and how, and of the price we, as 
a society, will put on equality, as on our 
present levels of inequality. 
There is, in fact, a range of conceivable 
options that, in some combination or 
other, could reduce social stratification 
and economic inequality:
• public investment in the early years, 
and in health and education services 
generally, to enable upwards social 
mobility at the bottom;
• investment in state housing and 
income-related rents;
• economic and regulatory reform, 
immigration policy, and investment 
in infrastructure, research and 
development, capital per worker, and 
education and training (including 
significantly raising management skills 
and performance), to improve labour 
productivity and create a high-wage 
economy;
• active labour market policies to move 
people off welfare and into sustainable 
employment;
• employment law which discourages 
both under- and over-employment;
• redistributive policies implemented 
through tax and transfers; 
• policies to promote economic 
democracy and greater equality in gross 
incomes before taxes and transfers: for 
example, the setting or raising of a 
minimum wage, the introduction of a 
guaranteed minimum income, and/or 
a ceiling on remuneration at the top, at 
least in the state sector;
• encouragement of collective bargaining 
of wages and terms and conditions of 
employment;
• tax policies and social marketing 
to encourage volunteering and 
philanthropy and otherwise support 
a strong community and voluntary 
sector; and
• investment in public broadcasting, and 
in institutions, urban design, public 
transport and public space, so that 
citizens of all sorts can rub shoulders, 
encounter the reality of one another’s 
lives, build social capital and social 
cohesion and constitute a common 
public.
All these options come at a price and 
their cost-benefit needs to be calculated 
within a fiscal context that determines 
certain limits to and opportunities for 
what can be undertaken at any particular 
point in time. And in fact, none of these 
has been entirely absent from government 
policy during the period inequality has 
grown in New Zealand society. The 
issue is rather that government has not 
thought through its policy interventions 
as a coherent package that is explicitly 
designed to reduce social stratification 
and economic inequality and to promote 
social mobility at the bottom. The focus 
has been rather on ‘baking a bigger cake’ 
The issue is rather that government has not 
thought through its policy interventions as a 
coherent package that is explicitly designed 
to reduce social stratification and economic 
inequality and to promote social mobility  
at the bottom.
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and ‘the rising tide that lifts all boats’, 
with a great deal of public expenditure 
on programmes and services (whether 
ameliorative or merely palliative) to 
relieve the symptoms of social distress.4 
Political price
Thirdly, ideas, and especially big ideas, 
come with a political price. 
The job of democratically elected 
politicians is to develop, promote and 
vote for policies that express the will of 
the people they represent in Parliament. 
The 2005 and 2008 general elections 
were contested, in significant part, over 
tax cuts. The National-led government 
elected in 2008 has delivered these, in a 
relatively even-handed manner, to general 
approval. 
The prime minister has made much 
of the 2010 tax changes as being ‘fairer’ 
(Key, 2010a). They are fair, if fairness 
is construed as a roughly proportional 
impact across all income bands, rather 
than as a narrowing of the gap between rich 
and poor. The Treasury has estimated the 
impact of the tax changes as a percentage 
of average disposable household income 
across all income bands as between 0.4 
and 0.7% (English, 2010b, p.9). The tax 
measures announced in the 2010 Budget 
will probably make no measurable 
difference to income inequality in New 
Zealand. Indeed, in a pre-Budget warm-
up the prime minister urged Kiwis not to 
be jealous if the rich get more – ‘because 
the rich are crucial to the economy’ (Key, 
2010b).
If Wilkinson and Pickett’s ‘big idea’ is to 
get any political traction in New Zealand, 
then the electorate will have to want, and 
demand, a different kind of fairness, a 
different kind of future New Zealand. 
The New Zealand Listener recently 
highlighted some findings of Massey 
University’s Department of Marketing’s 
International Social Survey Programme 
(New Zealand Listener, 2010).5 When 
the respondents were asked ‘Are income 
differences in New Zealand too large?’, 
62% said yes, compared to 75% in 1999 and 
72% in 1992. When asked ‘Should people 
on higher incomes pay a larger share of 
their income in taxes than those on lower 
incomes?’, 53% said yes, compared to 60% 
in 1999 and 71% in 1992. When asked 
‘Should the Government reduce income 
differences between people?’, 40% said yes 
compared to 52% in 1992. 
A similar shift in values was evidenced 
in a 2010 UMR Research survey of 750 
people (ibid., p.15).6 To the statement 
‘Inequality continues because it benefits 
the rich and powerful’, 44% agreed, 
compared to 60% in 1992. To the statement 
‘Large income differences are necessary 
for New Zealand’s economic prosperity’, 
32% disagreed, compared to 60% in 1992. 
These findings are consistent with those of 
the New Zealand Election Study (http://
www.nzes.org/) and give little hope that 
the electorate will demand a reduction in 
income inequalities any time soon.
A democratically-elected government, 
if it wishes to retain power, will implement 
policies that reflect its manifesto 
commitments and electoral mandate. 
To do otherwise, even from the highest 
of ethical motives, courts failure in the 
polls. Wilkinson and Pickett concede that, 
in fact, ‘governments have usually not 
pursued more egalitarian policies until 
they thought their survival depended on 
it’ (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010, p.241).
a new Deal for the 21st century?
Wilkinson and Pickett invite ‘a historic 
shift in the sources of human satisfaction 
from economic growth to a more sociable 
society’ (ibid., p.231). They suggest that 
developed nations are ‘close to the end of 
what economic growth can do for us’ (p.5). 
They urge developed nations to trade off 
an economic growth path and material 
consumption against improvements in 
quality of life as measured by health, 
happiness, friendship and community 
life, and to do so in ways that are 
environmentally sustainable and that will 
both mitigate against and adapt to climate 
change.
There seems to be little political will 
in New Zealand at present for such a 
New Deal, and that is unlikely to change 
unless an alternative vision of society 
captures the hearts and minds of New 
Zealanders. Short of a national crisis to 
shake things up (a major earthquake in 
the capital? a volcanic eruption in the 
Auckland region?), building the case for 
a politics of equality will be a long-term 
task. Specifically, we need to improve our 
understanding of:
• when and in which respects inequality 
is bad for almost everyone, and when 
poor outcomes exhibit strong social 
gradation and why;
• whether, in which respects and to 
what extent the relationship between 
economic inequality and poor social 
outcomes is one of causation rather 
than correlation;
• the relationships that prevail over 
time between income inequality, skills, 
labour productivity, social capital and 
the efficient operation of economic 
markets;
• social mobility in New Zealand, 
particularly at the bottom and in terms 
of urbanisation and the geographical 
clustering of disadvantage;
• life-course and intergenerational 
accumulation and transmission of 
advantage and disadvantage; and
• the dynamic relationships between 
ethno-cultural homogeneity/diversity, 
social capital and attitudes to income 
inequality and redistribution.
... [Wilkinson and Pickett] urge developed 
nations to trade off an economic growth 
path and material consumption against 
improvements in quality of life as measured 
by health, happiness, friendship and 
community life,...
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Above all, a politics of equality will 
require a great deal of public debate about 
the kind of society we want to create here 
and the price we are willing to pay, now 
and in the future, to achieve it. 
1 See further Wilkinson and Pickett (2010, p.250) on the ratio 
of CEO pay to average worker pay.
2 New Zealand responses to the International Social Survey 
Programme on perceived deserved incomes for a company 
chairperson relative to an unskilled factory worker have 
scarcely changed since 1992, with median values of 4.0 in 
1992 and 4.3 in 2009.
3 Runciman (2009) points out that Wilkinson and Pickett 
fudge an important distinction between the claim that in 
more equal societies almost everyone does better, and 
the claim that everyone does better on average. Compare 
the sub-titles of various editions of The Spirit Level: ‘why 
more equal societies almost always do better’; ‘why greater 
equality makes societies stronger’; ‘why equality is better for 
everyone’.
4 New Zealand currently spends close to $51 billion (72% of 
core Crown expenditure, or 25% of New Zealand’s nominal 
GDP) on social security and welfare, health, education, and 
law and order (English, 2010a).
5 The New Zealand survey was conducted in 2009 by a mail 
survey of around 1,000 responses. Some questions were not 
asked in 1999. Margin of error of ±3% or less (at the 95% 
confidence level).
6 Margin of error of ±3.6% (for a 50% figure at the 95% 
confidence level).
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